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Abstract  Many non-physicalists, including Chalmers, hold that the zombie argument 
succeeds in rejecting the physicalist view of consciousness. Some non-
physicalists, including, again, Chalmers, hold that quantum collapse 
interactionism (QCI), i.e., the idea that non-physical consciousness causes 
collapse of the wave function in phenomena such as quantum measurement, is a 
viable interactionist solution for the problem of the relationship between the 
physical world and the non-physical consciousness. In this paper, I argue that if 
QCI is true, the zombie argument fails. In particular, I show that if QCI is true, a 
zombie world physically identical to our world is impossible because there is at 
least one law of nature, a fundamental law of physics in particular, that exist only 
in the zombie world but not in our world. This shows that philosophers like 
Chalmers are committing an error in endorsing the zombie argument and QCI 
at the same time. 
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1. Introduction 
Physicalists hold that consciousness is either physical or can be reductively explained in terms of physical 
entities and processes—e.g., in terms of brain and neural processes. The zombie argument is one of the 
most well-known anti-physicalist arguments. It relies on the conceivability of zombies: creatures that are 
physically identical to conscious beings but lack consciousness. According to the zombie argument, we 
can conceive a world that is physically identical to our world but instead of conscious beings, it is filled 
with their zombie twins. If such a world is conceivable, it is metaphysically possible and if it is 
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metaphysically possible, consciousness is not physical. If it was, a world physically identical to our world 
without consciousness wouldn’t be possible. Now, if consciousness is non-physical, what is its 
relationship with the physical world? Historically, one major approach to address this question is 
interactionism. It is the idea that consciousness and the physical world are causally efficacious on one 
another: conscious states cause physical states and physical states cause conscious states.  
There is a debate in the literature about the consistency of the zombie argument and 
interactionism. John Perry (2001, pp. 72–77, 2012) famously argues that if interactionism is true, some 
physical events are caused by consciousness in our world. Since there is no consciousness in the zombie 
world, either these physical events do not exist or, if they exist, they are physically caused. Anyway, the 
zombie world would not be physically identical to our world and hence the zombie argument fails. In 
response, Chalmers (2004) suggests that the zombie world has causal gaps. That is, the physical events 
that are caused by consciousness in our world do happen in the zombie world but without cause. This 
proposal aims to keep the two worlds physically identical without damaging the conceivability of the 
zombie world. 
In this paper, I argue that Chalmers’ proposal does not succeed. For this reason, I focus on 
(arguably) the most prominent version of interactionism, recently advocated by Chalmers and 
McQueen (forthcoming), that I call Quantum Collapse Interactionism (QCI). Briefly, it is the idea that 
consciousness causes the collapse of the wave function in phenomena such as quantum measurement. I 
argue that if QCI is true, the zombie world is physically different from our world and therefore the 
zombie argument fails.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the zombie argument. In 
Section 3, I explain QCI in detail. In this paper, I do not discuss the independent plausibility of the 
zombie argument or QCI. Rather, in Section 4, I show that if QCI is true, the zombie argument fails 
because the zombie world and our world would be physically different. In particular, I show that there is 
a law of nature in the zombie world that does not exist in our world. Finally, in Section 5, I consider two 
objections against my argument and show that they do not succeed in eliminating the inconsistency 
between the zombie argument and QCI. 
2. The Zombie Argument  
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The zombie argument1 relies on the conceivability of zombies. My zombie twin is my exact physical 
replica, molecule-by-molecule identical to me, who shares all my functions and behavioral dispositions, 
but lacks consciousness. When I touch a very sharp object, for instance, my nervous system reacts, I move 
my hand quickly, and say ‘ouch’ loudly. My zombie twin demonstrates all these reactions too. However, 
whereas I feel pain, my zombie twin does not. According to the proponents of the zombie argument, we 
can imagine a zombie world which is physically identical to our world—i.e., all the physical facts about it 
are the same as all the physical facts about our world—but everyone in it is the zombie twin of their twin 
conscious being in our world. The zombie argument states that if the zombie world (or my zombie twin) 
is conceivable, then it is metaphysically possible. But this means that consciousness should be a non-
physical component of our world. “If God could have created a zombie world, then […] after creating 
the physical processes in our world, he had to do more work to ensure that it contained consciousness” 
(Chalmers 2003, p. 106). Therefore, the argument goes, consciousness is non-physical. 
3. Quantum Collapse Interactionism (QCI) 
Some believe that quantum mechanics provides us with new resources to think about the relationship 
between the physical and the mental. In particular, some physicists and philosophers suggest that a 
phenomenon in quantum measurement called the collapse of the wave-function is evidence for 
interactionism.2 To clarify this proposal, let’s begin with an ordinary case of measurement or 
observation.  
Imagine that there is a very large bag full of small balls. The bag is made of thick fabric so we 
cannot see the color of the balls when they are in the bag. For millions of times, whenever we brought a 
ball out of the bag, its color was either black or white. Under normal circumstances, we commonly 
concede that the color of a ball that is observed to be black (or white) was already black (or white) when 
it was in the bag, namely, before observing its color. But imagine we realize that when the balls are still in 
 
1 Different versions of the zombie argument can be found in the literature—for an extensive list, see 
(Kirk 2015). Here, I focus on Chalmers (1996, pp. 94–99, 2003, pp. 105–106, 2010). 
2 There are several proposals about the relationship between consciousness and quantum physics. Two 
interesting summaries reflecting the diversity of these proposals can be found in Atmanspacher (2017) 
and Pylkkänen (2018). It should be mentioned that some of these proposals are physicalist. Penrose 
(1989, 1994), for instance, aims to explain consciousness in terms of quantum physics in general and 
collapse of the wave-function in particular. 
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the bag, they are not simply either black or white. Rather, they are either black, or white, or some shade 
of grey such as silver grey, elephant grey, magnetic grey, asphalt grey, and so on. But once we bring them 
out of the bag and observe their color, they always turn into either black or white. This is a very simple 
illustration of what happens in quantum measurement. When, for instance, we measure or observe the 
spin of an electron, it is always either up or down. However, our best physical theory indicates that in 
many situations, before conducting the measurement, the spin is not merely either up or down. Rather, it 
might be in a state called a superposition of states that is not up or down but something “in-between,” 
similar to the shades of grey that are “in-between” black and white. The process of shifting from a 
superposition of states to a single measured state (called an eigenstate), which happens at the moment 
of measurement, is called the collapse of the wave-function (henceforth simply “collapse”). 
The standard theory of quantum mechanics tells us that the superposition of states collapses 
into eigenstate at the moment of measurement. Yet, it does not tell us what exactly constitutes 
measurement (this is the well-known quantum measurement problem). Different interpretations of 
quantum mechanics propose different answers to the quantum measurement problem. The 
Copenhagen Interpretation, considered by many as the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics, 
suggests that quantum measurement can be understood in terms of the interaction between microscopic 
objects (e.g., electrons) that obey quantum mechanical laws and macroscopic measuring devices that are 
“entirely described in irreducibly classical terms” (Schlosshauer 2007, p. 27). In this view, the borderline 
between the quantum world and the ordinary world—which is called the Heisenberg cut—separates the 
domain in which an electron’s spin can be in a superposition of states from the domain in which it can 
only be in the classic-like eigenstate of “either up or down.” 
In his very influential Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (2018/1932), von 
Neumann claims that although we have to accept the Heisenberg cut and “divide the world into two 
parts, the one being the observed system, the other the observer” (2018/1932, 272), there is no 
unarbitrary way to decide where exactly the cut and hence the moment of measurement (and collapse) 
should be placed. We can place it between microscopic objects and measuring devices, or between 
measuring devices and the human observer, or on the observer’s retina, or optic nerve, or brain. 
According to von Neumann, in this latter case, the observer is the physicist’s “abstract “ego”” 
(2018/1932, 273) and the observed system is her brain, optic fiber, retina, measuring devices, and 
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microscopic objects altogether. Based on von Neumann’s account of quantum measurement, some 
physicists have suggested that we could push the Heisenberg cut all the way up towards the observer 
such that everything made out of atoms (and hence material) becomes a part of the observed system. 
Here, the only thing that is left to be the observer is non-material consciousness that causes the collapse 
(London and Bauer 1983/1939; Stapp 2001, 2007; Wigner 1961, 1964). This is the gist of QCI 
according to which non-physical conscious intervention causes collapse.3 
In The Conscious Mind (1996), Chalmers considers, but does not advocate, QCI as a candidate 
for explaining the relationship between the physical world and the non-physical consciousness. In a later 
work, he claims that there is no “knockdown argument” against QCI (1999, pp. 492–3). Recently, his 
view of QCI has become even more enthusiastic. He (2003, pp. 125–6) claims that quantum mechanics 
is “perfectly compatible” with QCI and “positively encouraging” its possibility. Moreover, similar to the 
proponents of QCI, he holds that “it is natural to suggest that a measurement is precisely a conscious 
observation, and that this conscious observation causes a collapse.” Finally, in their “Consciousness and 
the Collapse of the Wave Function” (forthcoming), Chalmers and McQueen examine QCI in detail and 
endorse it as a viable research program to explain the relationship between the physical and the mental.  
Here, we do not need to go through the details of their model of QCI and a general picture is 
sufficient for the purpose of our current discussion. In their view, conscious states nomologically 
supervene on quasi-classical brain states. That is, there are some fundamental “physics-to-
consciousness” law(s) stating how consciousness arises from physical processes of some parts of the 
brain called “physical correlates of consciousness” (PCC). When PCC enters into a superposition of 
states, since consciousness is always in alignment with PCC, it enters into the superposition too. Yet, 
consciousness is superposition-resistant and if it gets superposed, it rapidly collapses. The collapse of 
consciousness, according to a “consciousness-to-physics” law, results in the collapse of PCC which, in 
turn, results in the collapse of the superposed system that PCC is a part of. For instance, when an 
experimenter measures the spin of a superposed electron, as a result of the interaction between the 
 
3 It should be mentioned that not all interpretations of quantum mechanics are “collapse 
interpretations.” For instance, Everett’s many-worlds interpretation and Bohm’s hidden variables 
interpretation do not embrace collapse. Moreover, QCI is only one of the collapse interpretations—and 
not a very popular one (Schlosshauer et al. 2013). For instance, Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) theory 
of spontaneous collapse is also a collapse interpretation but consciousness plays no role in it. 
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electron and the measuring device, the device gets “entangled” with the electron and enters into the 
same superposition of states. Similarly, as a result of the interaction between “the electron and the 
measuring device” system and the experimenter’s retina, the retina enters into the superposition of states 
and so on until the PCC gets superposed. However, PCC’s superposition results in the superposition of 
consciousness. At this point, consciousness rapidly collapses and causes the collapse of PCC (and every 
physical object that is entangled with it) into its eigenstate. 
In the following, I argue that if QCI is true, the zombie argument fails because there can’t be a 
zombie world physically identical to our world. Thus, between the zombie argument and QCI, one can 
only select one. 
4. Can there Be a Zombie World Physically Identical to Our World? 
Let’s suppose that QCI is true in our world. That is, let’s suppose that consciousness is non-physical and 
it causes collapse. To run the zombie argument, three zombie worlds can be taken into account: 
(1) A zombie world in which collapse occurs with a physical cause; 
(2) A zombie world in which collapse does not occur; 
(3) A zombie world in which collapse occurs uncaused. 
As mentioned before, John Perry (2001, pp. 72–77, 2012) provides general arguments showing that if 
interactionism is true, worlds similar to (1) and (2)—that is, zombie worlds in which the physical effects 
of consciousness either do not exist, or they are caused physically—are not physically identical to our 
world. Therefore, they cannot be used to run the zombie argument. In the case of collapse, in (1), 
collapse has a physical cause. Therefore, there is a physical causal relationship in (1) that does not exist 
in our world. If we adopt Frank Jackson’s definition of physical facts, that is, “everything in completed 
physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts 
consequent upon all this” (1986, p. 291), then there is a physical fact, corresponding to this physical 
causal relation in (1) that does not exist in our world. In (2), collapse never occurs. So the result of an 
experiment in which a zombie physicist measures the spins of some electrons is always different from the 
result of an identical experiment done by her twin human physicist. This, again, constitutes a physical 
difference between (2) and our world. So the only remaining option, which is endorsed by Chalmers 
(2004), is (3): a zombie world in which collapse occurs exactly as it does in our world but without any 
cause.  
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In the following, I argue that if QCI is true, there is a physical fact about (3) that is not true in 
our world. Therefore, even if the zombie world is like (3), it is still physically distinguishable from our 
world. (Henceforth, by ‘the zombie world’ I always mean (3).) 
4.1. A Zombie World with Uncaused Collapses 
As mentioned before, assuming that QCI is true in our world, according to Chalmers and McQueen’s 
account, the following fact about collapse in the human world is true: 
FCH Always collapse occurs at the moment that consciousness enters (or is about to 
enter) into a superposition of states. 
If FCH is the most basic fact about collapse in the human world, which seems a reasonable claim, in the 
zombie world, where there is no consciousness, the following statement can be considered its 
corresponding fact about collapse: 
FCZ Always collapse occurs at the moment that PCC4 enters into a superposition of 
states. 
Prima facie, in the zombie world, FCZ looks like the perfect equivalent of FCH in the human world. First, 
it is a purely physical fact that does not cite any non-physical or psychophysical entity or relation. 
Second, it is a common fact between the zombie world and the human world because it is true in both 
worlds. Finally, FCZ does not add any entity or causal relation that does not exist in the human world to 
the zombie world. The only major difference between FCH and FCZ is that the former cites the cause of 
collapse, namely, consciousness. FCZ, however, is merely a “brute fact” about collapse in the zombie 
world that does not draw a causal relation between PCC and collapse because in the zombie world 
collapse is uncaused. Overall, however, if FCZ is true, collapse occurs in the zombie world as it occurs in 
the human world and hence the two worlds are physically identical. 
I do not think that this proposal succeeds in eliminating all physical differences between the 
zombie world and the human world. In the following, I argue that FCZ, if true, is a law of nature—a 
fundamental law of physics, in particular—only in the zombie world but not in our world. This means 
that there is at least one physical fact about the zombie world that is not a fact of our world. Therefore, 
these two worlds are not physically identical. 
 
4 The physical correlates of consciousness (PCC) in a zombie is the part of her brain that if she was her 
human twin, her consciousness would nomologically supervene on it. 
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4.2. FCH and FCZ: Three Similarities 
Assuming that FCH and FCZ are true in their worlds, some interesting and interrelated similarities 
emerge between them. First, they both can be used to explain instances of collapse in their worlds. 
Consider, for example, a particular instance of collapse that occurs when an electron’s spin is measured. 
In the human world, when the system that includes the superposed electron entangles with PCC and, as 
a result, the experimenter’s consciousness is about to get superposed, collapse happens. Here, FCH 
provides a proper answer for “Why did the system collapse?” Facing a similar question in the zombie 
world, one can properly say “Because always collapse occurs at the moment that PCC enters into a 
superposition of states.” 
Prima facie, one might think that only FCH is a proper explanation for particular instances of 
collapse because it cites consciousness which is the cause of collapse. But FCZ does not cite the cause of 
collapse. Quite conversely, it implies that it is uncaused and hence it does not really explain particular 
instances of collapse in the zombie world. There are two problems with this claim. First, citing a cause 
for an event is not the only way to explain it. Most major recent accounts of scientific explanation are 
open to the possibility of non-causal explanations for particular events, partially because there are many 
cases of non-causal explanations in science (Bokulich 2018; Lange 2017; Woodward 2005, p. 221, 
2018). Granted, FCZ does not cite any cause for an instance of collapse in the zombie world. Yet, it can 
be considered a non-causal explanation (e.g., a structural explanation) for collapse, in the same way that 
“Nothing can travel faster than the speed of light” explains an electron’s subluminal velocity without 
citing any cause for it.5  
Secondly, one might even argue that FCZ is indeed a causal explanation for instances of collapse 
in the zombie world. According to David Lewis (1986, p. 217), “to explain an event is to provide some 
information about its causal history” (original italics). In his view, saying that an event is uncaused still 
provides some information, albeit negative information, about the event’s causal history by stating that it 
is empty. If one admits this view, FCZ can be considered a causal explanation for instances of collapse in 
the zombie world exactly because it implies that collapse is uncaused. Therefore, FCZ can be used as an 
 
5 Woodward (2005, pp. 208–09), for instance, argues that “Nothing can travel faster than the speed of 
light” is not a causal explanation for the subluminal speed of an electron (cf. Skow 2014, pp. 455–57). 
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explanation (whether non-causal or causal) for instances of collapse in the zombie world. This 
constitutes the first interesting similarity between FCH and FCZ. 
The second interesting similarity between FCH and FCZ is that they both support relevant 
counterfactuals in their corresponding worlds. Imagine, for instance, that a human physicist and her 
zombie twin are about to measure the spin of the superposed electron e. However, their brain does not 
interact with the superposed system of the physical entities that are entangled with e because, for 
instance, they leave the lab just before the interaction happens. Would the superposed system collapse if 
it had entangled with their brain? In the human world and in the zombie world, we can respond 
positively to this question in virtue of FCH and FCZ, respectively. 
It is quite obvious that FCH supports the counterfactual claim. If the system had entangled with 
the human physicist’s brain, his consciousness would enter into a superposition of states. This, however, 
would result in the collapse of the system. Yet, when it comes to the zombie world, one might object to 
the claim that FCZ supports the counterfactual “If the system had entangled with the zombie physicist’s 
brain (and hence his PCC), it would collapse.” First, it might be said that the counterfactual is true but 
not in virtue of FCZ. Rather, there is another proposition, true in the zombie world, which supports this 
counterfactual. My answer to this objection is simple but, I believe, strong. First, the burden of proof is 
on the objector to tell us what true proposition in the zombie world supports the counterfactual. Second, 
it is very unlikely for the objector to find any such proposition. After all, in the zombie world, the only 
relevant fact that we know about collapse and its relationship with the brain in general and PCC in 
particular is FCZ. 
Secondly, the objector might deny the truth of the counterfactual altogether. Namely, she might 
say that in the zombie world, it is not true that if the superposed system had been entangled with the 
zombie physicist’s brain, it would collapse. If the counterfactual is false and FCZ is true, then FCZ cannot 
support the counterfactual. This claim is problematic too. If we adopt the possible worlds approach in 
interpreting counterfactual conditionals, the counterfactual is true if and only if in all of the most similar 
possible worlds to the zombie world in which the system entangles with PCC, it collapses. Thus, the 
counterfactual is false if there is a possible world, most similar to the zombie world, in which if the 
system entangles with PCC, it does not collapse. Such a possible world should “depart” from the zombie 
world after the system’s entering into a superposition but before zombie physicist’s leaving the lab. So 
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she stays in the lab, the system entangles with her brain, and hence her PCC enters into a superposition 
of states, but it does not collapse. Since this possible world is perfectly similar to the zombie world up to 
after the system’s entering into a superposition, it has the same laws of nature as the zombie world. Yet, 
collapse does not occur when PCC enters into the superposition. This means that “superposed PCC 
without collapse” is physically possible in a world with the same laws of nature as the zombie world. 
Therefore, it should be physically possible in the zombie world too. 
Obviously, if such a possibility gets actualized, that is, if a zombie physicist’s brain entangles with 
a superposed system but doesn’t collapse, we have a physical difference between the zombie world and 
our world. To avoid this problem, we should admit that although “superposed PCC without collapse” is 
physically possible in the zombie world, it never happens. In this regard, “superposed PCC without 
collapse” is just like many other physically possible things that never happen. It is physically possible for 
me to throw my laptop out of the window or to speak Esperanto. But, as much as I am concerned, they 
never happen. I never throw my laptop out of the window because it will be destroyed. I never speak 
Esperanto because I have no reason to learn it and one cannot speak a language without learning it. 
Similarly, the objector might say that “superposed PCC without collapse” is physically possible in the 
zombie world but it just never happens. There is, however, a problem here. To say that an event that 
never happens is physically possible is to say that there is some physically attainable condition under 
which the event can actually happen. I never throw my laptop out of the window but there is some 
physically attainable condition under which I will do that (e.g., if an aggressor is out there who wants to 
severely hurt me and throwing my laptop at him is my only choice to save my life). I never speak 
Esperanto but there is some physically attainable condition under which I will learn and speak Esperanto 
(e.g., if I have a daughter who loves Esperanto and I realize that speaking Esperanto with her is a great 
way to strengthen our relationship). Similarly, if “superposed PCC without collapse” is physically 
possible in the zombie world, there must be some physically attainable condition under which a 
zombie’s PCC can be superposed without collapsing. This, however, means that if under such condition 
we compare the brain of the zombie physicist with that of her human twin, there is a physical difference 
between them. To avoid this problematic consequence, we should admit that the counterfactual claim is 
true in the zombie world. That is, FCZ supports relevant counterfactuals in the zombie world. 
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The third interesting similarity between FCH and FCZ pertains to how they receive confirmation 
from their instances. When a human physicist hypothesizes that FCH is true, how can she convince other 
physicists that she is correct? She probably needs to provide some theoretical grounds for her claim, 
similar to what Chalmers and McQueen do in their work, and conduct some experiments to show that 
collapse really occurs as a result of conscious intervention. She might succeed or not but, anyway, she is 
not expected to test all possible cases of collapse to convince her colleagues that FCH is true. In this 
regard, FCH is unlike the claim that “All the coins in my pocket are nickels.” This claim can be known to 
be true only if I check all the coins in my pocket and see that they are nickels. 
The situation is similar for FCZ. Imagine, for instance, that a zombie physicist proposes that FCZ 
might be true and a group of zombie experimental physicists conduct some experiments and observe 
that collapse really occurs when PCC is superposed. Do zombie physicists go ahead and conduct 
quantum experiments that rely, in one way or another, on the assumption that collapse will occur 
according to FCZ? For instance, do they go ahead and examine whether large systems can also enter into 
a superposition and collapse? Do they conduct experiments to detect collapse of the wave function 
under different circumstances? Or, rather, every time they hesitate to conduct such experiments because 
they are worried that despite all previous cases, maybe collapse ceases to occur when PCC enters into a 
superposition? If zombie physicists’ behavior and scientific practice resemble that of their human twins6 
(and they should), they would simply assume that collapse will occur at that moment. That is, they 
would take previous cases of collapse when PCC is superposed as confirming evidence for future untested 
cases of collapse at this moment without thinking that they need to test all possible cases of superposed 
PCC to see whether FCZ is true. Therefore, both FCH and FCZ are taken to be well-established before an 
exhaustive enumeration of all their instances. Thus, they can be used to predict future cases of collapse 
too. 
 
6 As noted by many, whether or not a claim receives confirmation from evidence is always sensitive to 
the background beliefs (see, for instance, Lange 2000, p. 112; Sober 1988, p. 19). If we adopt 
representationalism, zombies cannot have beliefs because beliefs are some kind of mental state. 
Therefore, they cannot really confirm their beliefs. But since, ex hypothesi, zombie’s behavior perfectly 
resembles their human counterparts, here I adopt the dispositionalist view of belief according to which 
beliefs should be understood in terms of behavioral dispositions. For more on this distinction, see 
Schwitzgebel (2019). 
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4.3. FCZ and the Characteristics of Laws of Nature 
If my arguments are sound, the universal regularity FCZ has three important characteristics in the 
zombie world: (1) it explains particular instances of the regularity, (2) it supports corresponding 
counterfactuals, and (3) it receives instantial confirmation from its observed instances and hence can be 
used for making predictions about unobserved instances.  
But there is a nearly unanimous consensus in the literature on laws of nature that these 
characteristics demarcate laws of nature from accidental regularities. Humeans (Lewis 1973; Loewer 
1996, p. 11), non-Humeans (Armstrong 1983, Chapter 4; Bird 1998, Chapter 1; Dretske 1977; Tooley 
1977, 1987, p. 57), antireductionists (Lange 2000, pp. 11–23), and even antirealist (van Fraassen 1989, 
Chapter 2) all agree that only laws of nature—but not accidental regularities—instantiate these 
characteristics. One (or probably the) major reason for this consensus is that these characteristics are 
essential in how laws are actually used in scientific practice. Disagreements among the proponents of 
different accounts of laws of nature are primarily about explaining how and why laws of nature instantiate 
such nomic characteristics while, for instance, accidental generalizations fail to do so—or, in the case of 
antirealists, whether there is anything that really instantiates such characteristics. Now, since FCZ 
satisfies all the above-mentioned conditions, according to all major accounts of laws of nature, FCZ is a 
law of nature (a law of physics, in particular).  
To argue otherwise, that is, to argue that FCZ is not a law of nature but a mere accidental 
regularity, one needs to show that as opposed to what I argued for, either FCZ does not satisfy the above-
mentioned conditions or, more strongly, that satisfying those conditions does not make it a law of 
nature. The latter simply amounts to a whole new view of laws of nature, dramatically different from our 
current philosophical and scientific understanding of laws and their properties. The former, I believe, 
seems like a daunting task too, especially because we have to model the zombie world after our own 
world. Given QCI, since FCH is true in the human world, we have to assume that FCZ is true in the 
zombie world. Moreover, even in the human world, FCZ is not only true but also the physical part of the 
law-governed psychophysical mechanism of collapse. Consequently, as I have shown, we have very 
strong intuitions that FCZ manifests uniquely nomic characteristics such as explaining instances of 
collapse, supporting relevant counterfactuals, and receiving confirmation from its instances. 
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But FCZ is not just a law of physics. Rather, it is a fundamental law of physics. It instantiates the 
characteristics that Chalmers mentions for fundamental laws, namely, marking “the end of the 
explanatory chain” (1996, p. 76), describing fundamental features of the world (1996, p. 126), simplicity 
(1996, p. 127), and being clear and precise (1996, pp. 338–39). FCZ is simple, it cannot be explained 
and has to be taken as a brute fact about the zombie world. It describes collapse, which is a fundamental 
physical process that, together with Schrödinger’s equation, constitute the “core of quantum mechanics” 
(Chalmers 1996, p. 336). FCZ is also clear and precise. In fact, if we finally succeed in constructing a 
complete and precise psychophysical theory of consciousness—as Chalmers suggests—then we shall 
know what PCC exactly is and, as a result, all the current ambiguities of FCZ will be eliminated. 
But FCZ does not manifest the characteristics of laws of nature in the human world. First, it does 
not support relevant counterfactuals in the human world. For instance, given QCI, although 
counterfactual “If a superposed system had entangled with Sarah’s brain, it would collapse” is true in our 
world, it is not true in virtue of FCZ. Rather, it is true in virtue of the truth of the following proposition: 
a) “If a superposed system had entangled with Sarah’s brain, her PCC would be superposed;” 
b) “If Sara’s PCC had been superposed, her consciousness would be superposed;” 
c) “If Sara’s consciousness had been superposed, it would collapse;” 
d) “If Sara’s consciousness had been collapsed, her PCC would collapse.” 
Here, (a) is true because it is supported by a law of physics and the other counterfactuals are true 
because they are supported by psychophysical laws posited by Chalmers and McQueen’s model of QCI. 
Therefore, “If a superposed system had entangled with Sarah’s brain, it would collapse” is not true in 
virtue of FCZ. 
Second, in the human world, FCZ does not explain instances of collapse. It is obviously not a 
causal explanation because it does not cite the cause of collapse, i.e., conscious intervention. Moreover, 
FCZ does not provide a non-causal explanation for collapse either. A complete argument for this claim 
goes beyond the scope of this paper because to show that FCZ is not a non-causal explanation for 
collapse, one needs to show that it does not fit the characteristics of any types of non-causal explanation 
or to show that collapse is not a kind of fact that admits such explanations. So, here, relying on the most 
comprehensive account of non-causal explanations in the literature (Lange 2017), I simply provide a 
brief overview.  
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Some non-causal explanations explain an event by identifying some particular constraint with 
which the world must comply. This constraint can be mathematical or physical. For instance,7 a mother 
always fails to distribute exactly 23 strawberries evenly among her 3 children (without cutting 
strawberries) because 23 cannot be divided evenly into whole numbers by 3. Or, one might argue, an 
electron does not travel faster than the speed of light because nothing can travel faster than the speed of 
light (that is, the speed of light is a physical constraint for speed). Another type of non-causal 
explanation is what Lange calls a “Really Statistical” explanation which shows that the explanandum is 
“just a statistical fact of life” (2017, p. 189). An example of a “Really Statistical” explanation is explaining 
a phenomenon by regression toward the mean. Now, it is quite obvious that FCZ does not identify a 
mathematical constraint to which the world must conform. It does not identify a physical constraint 
either. If it was, that is, if collapse’s occurring at the moment of PCC’s entering into a superposition was 
a physical constraint to which the world must comply, then collapse should have occurred at this 
moment even without conscious intervention. This, however, is inconsistent with QCI. Finally, the 
phenomenon of collapse is not just a statistical fact, nor is FCZ a “Really Statistical” explanation. Thus, 
FCZ is not a non-causal explanation for collapse in our world. 
Therefore, FCZ does not instantiate the essential characteristics of laws of nature in our world. 
As a result, it is only a law of nature in the zombie world but not in our world. 
5. Two Objections  
So far, I have argued that FCZ is a fundamental physical law only in the zombie world. Thus, this world is 
not physically identical to ours. And if the two worlds are not physically identical, the zombie argument 
fails. In the following, I respond to two objections that aim to address the problem of inconsistency 
between the zombie argument and QCI in different ways. 
5.1. Objection One 
Any physicalist will agree that a conscious state at a given time t supervenes on some physical facts in a 
period that extends from some time before t up to t. For instance, according to physicalists, the state of 
my consciousness at the moment of writing these words supervenes on some physical facts within a 
period that extends from some time in the past up to the moment of writing these words. How long this 
 
7 The example is from Lange (2017, p. 6). 
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period is should not concern us here. Now, imagine a new zombie world that is physically identical to 
our world only until an arbitrary time in the future (t*). After t*, the new zombie world physically differs 
from our world such that collapse no longer occurs. According to the proposal, this new zombie world 
can be used to run the zombie argument because it is conceivable; it is physically identical to our world 
until t*; and, as a result, it includes all the physical facts that a physicalist might hold that our current 
conscious states supervene upon. Moreover, in this new zombie world, FCZ is false because after t* 
collapse will not occur when PCC is superposed. Thus, FCZ is not a law of nature in the new zombie 
world and hence it cannot constitute a physical difference between our world and the new zombie world. 
This means that we can accept the zombie argument and QCI without falling into inconsistency. 
I do not think that this proposal poses a serious challenge for us. We just need to introduce a 
new version of FCZ: 
FCZ* Until t*, always collapse occurs at the moment that PCC enters into a 
superposition of states. 
FCZ* is always true in the new zombie world (even after t*), it indicates a regularity in this world, it 
explains particular instances of this regularity, it supports corresponding counterfactuals, it admits 
instantial confirmation from its instances and can be used for prediction. Therefore, it is a law of nature 
in the new zombie world. However, it is not a law in our world and hence it constitutes a physical 
difference between the two worlds. 
It might be suggested that FCZ* cannot be a law of nature, because a law cannot contain any 
ineliminable references to specific individuals, times, places, events, and so on. In FCZ*, however, there is 
an ineliminable reference to a particular time that limits its application to a specific period of the zombie 
world’s history. Therefore, FCZ* is not a law of nature. There are two problems with this claim. First, as 
Lange (2000, pp. 34–39) argues, there is no reason to think that there is such a requirement for laws of 
nature. Regardless of the problems with cashing out what exactly this requirement amounts to, a law can 
play all of its scientific roles even if it includes a local predicate. FCZ* should be considered a law of 
nature because it has all the functions and essential characteristics that laws of nature have in science, 
even though it includes a local predicate. Secondly, and more importantly, the requirement that a law 
must cover the whole history of its corresponding world is especially ill-grounded in a world in which 
nature’s behavior is subject to change. The new zombie world is such a world. In this world, there is no 
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“superposed PCC without collapse” up to t* but afterward, collapse does not occur. If the physical 
behavior of a world changes at some point in its history, it shouldn’t be a surprise that its laws of nature 
change accordingly.8 
5.2. Objection Two 
According to the second objection, FCZ’s being a law of nature in the zombie world is not really 
problematic for the zombie argument. The objection goes as follows: 
Premise 1. The zombie world and our world must be physically identical only vis-à-vis the 
physical facts on which consciousness might supervene.  
Premise 2. Physical facts about collapse are not among the facts on which consciousness might 
supervene. 
Conclusion. Therefore, the zombie world and our world don’t have to be identical vis-à-vis the 
facts about collapse (e.g., FCZ).  
Consequently, FCZ’s being a law of nature in the zombie world but not in our world does not render the 
zombie world unsuitable for running the zombie argument against physicalism. 
Here, the objector accepts that if we adopt QCI, the zombie world is not identical to our world 
but claims that this disanalogy is not problematic for the zombie argument because the two worlds are 
identical regarding the physical facts upon which consciousness might supervene. But this objection 
succeeds only if the objector can provide us with a sufficiently specific theory of consciousness according 
to which facts of collapse are not among the physical facts upon which consciousness supervenes. Let’s 
see if Chalmers has such a theory at his disposal.  
Chalmers and McQueen (forthcoming) structure their consciousness-collapse model around 
Tononi’s (2008; 2016) integrated information theory of consciousness. However, as they explain, this 
specific theory is not essential for their model. Rather, their approach “can be generalized to any 
psychophysical theory [of consciousness] linking quasi-classical states [of the brain] to states of 
consciousness” (emphasis added). In this picture, one might argue that facts of collapse, which belong to 
the domain of microphysical, are not included among the physical facts upon which consciousness 
supervenes because “quasi-classical” PCC does not really belong to the domain of microphysical. This 
 
8 It is worth mentioning that some hold that even in the course of our world’s history, laws of nature 
change and evolve (Peirce 1891; Smolin 2013). 
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claim, however, is not obviously correct. First, PCC is physical, can be superposed, and since it is related 
to consciousness, it collapses. Thus, in the set of all physical facts about PCC, there are some facts about 
collapse. Second, in Chalmers and McQueen’s model, the so-called Heisenberg cut is located either on 
PCC or between PCC and consciousness. Anyway, PCC is still in the domain of the quantum rather 
than the classic. These do not necessarily mean that these “collapse facts” are among the physical facts 
on which consciousness supervenes. For consciousness might supervene on a subset of all physical facts 
about PCC which does not include any collapse fact. But it also does not mean that the collapse facts are 
definitely excluded from this subset. To make the difference between the zombie world and our world 
irrelevant for the zombie argument, more works should be done to show that collapse facts are certainly 
not among the physical facts on which consciousness supervenes. 
But even if in Chalmers and McQueen’s theory of consciousness (CMTC), consciousness does 
not supervene on physical facts about collapse, zombie argument is still in trouble. As Chalmers and 
McQueen acknowledge, CMTC can be interpreted in two ways. It can be viewed dualistically when 
consciousness is taken to be non-physical and only nomologically supervening on PCC. Or it can be 
viewed physicalistically when consciousness is, for instance, identical to PCC. Let’s call the former “the 
dualist CMTC” and the latter “the physicalist CMTC.” They argue that both versions of CMTC can be 
used to provide good (and nearly empirically identical) consciousness-collapse models that provide us 
with empirically testable dynamics of collapse. Although the physicalist CMTC is ontologically more 
parsimonious—it only posits physical properties—they prefer the dualist CMTC because “we already 
have good reason to believe that consciousness is a fundamental [non-physical] property.” What is this 
“reason”? I assume that Chalmers’ response includes the collection of anti-physicalist arguments that he 
has offered in his works. 
Now, imagine that relying on the “original” zombie argument—which requires a zombie world 
physically identical to our world—we adopt the dualist CMTC and Chalmers and McQueen’s model for 
QCI. However, as a result of adopting QCI, a discrepancy emerges between the zombie world and our 
world regarding the FCZ. So we modify the zombie argument adding that it does not matter if the 
zombie world is not identical to our world regarding the facts of collapse because, according to CMTC, 
facts of collapse are not among the physical facts on which consciousness might supervene. Thus, a 
“revised” zombie argument according to which the two worlds need not be identical regarding the facts 
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about collapse, e.g., FCZ. But recall that we have used the “original” zombie argument—which does not 
work anymore—to support selecting the dualist CMTC rather than its physicalist rival. So now we need 
to go back and see whether the “revised” zombie argument can also be used to support this choice. 
Unfortunately, it cannot. For the “revised” zombie argument only works if we presuppose that facts about 
collapse are not among the physical facts on which consciousness might supervene. But this 
presupposition, in turn, is accepted only because of CMTC. To sum, if we accept CMTC, we do make 
the “revised” zombie argument non-problematic but then we cannot rely on the zombie argument to 
select the dualist CMTC rather than its physicalist rival. 
An obvious solution might be suggested for this problem: the zombie argument is only one of 
the many anti-physicalist arguments. We can invoke another argument, e.g., the knowledge argument, to 
support adopting the dualist CMTC instead of the physicalist CMTC. Once we adopt this theory, we go 
ahead and develop our QCI model and now we can show that the “revised” zombie argument works 
despite the fact that the two worlds are different regarding FCZ. This approach eliminates the 
inconsistency between QCI and the “revised” zombie argument but at a great cost: we can accept the 
“revised” zombie argument only after adopting non-physicalism relying on other arguments such as the 
knowledge argument. In other words, to eliminate the inconsistency between the “revised” zombie 
argument and QCI, this approach makes the zombie argument an obsolete anti-physicalist argument. 
6. Conclusion 
I argued that if QCI is true, that is, if collapse of the wavefunction is caused by consciousness, then there 
is a physical fact about the zombie world that is not a physical fact about our world. In particular, there is 
a fundamental law of physics in the zombie world that does not exist in our world. This argument is not, 
at least directly, an argument for physicalism—although it makes it harder for non-physicalists to explain 
the relationship between the mental and the physical by removing one of their options. Rather, it shows 
that philosophers like Chalmers are committing an error in endorsing the zombie argument and QCI at 
the same time.  
But the same conclusion can be seen from a more interesting perspective. Imagine that 
physicists and philosophers of physics follow Chalmers and McQueen’s proposal and adopt QCI as a 
research program to find, among other things, an answer for the quantum measurement problem. 
Moreover, imagine that this research program turns out to be impressively successful such that most 
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physicists and philosophers of physics accept it as the best solution for the quantum measurement 
problem. This might look like good news for the proponents of the zombie argument because it 
confirms the non-physicality of consciousness. Yet, it is not. As I argued, if QCI is true, the zombie 
argument fails. This would be a quite ironic situation: if the most well-known non-physicalist solution 
for the quantum measurement problem succeeds, the most well-known argument for non-physicalism 
fails. 
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